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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Submitted by

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

Department of State

(UNCLASSIFIED)

AFGHANISTAN

A.1. Status of Illicit Narcotics Production and Trafficking

Afghanistan remains a major producer of opium and hashish as well as an important producer of heroin. It is estimated that Afghanistan produced between 400 and 500 metric tons (MT) of opium in 1987, a significant increase compared to last year and considerably above the estimated 140-180 MT produced in 1984. It is unlikely that production will decrease in 1988. In fact, there are indications that the Afghan regime and the Soviets, for political reasons, are encouraging opium production in some areas of the country. President Reagan denied certification to Afghanistan on March 1, 1987, under Sec. 481(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act because Afghanistan had failed to cooperate with the U.S. on narcotics control.

Much of this opium is refined into heroin in Afghanistan or Pakistan and supplies addicts in the United States, Europe and South Asia. It is believed that trafficking in heroin increased in 1987 as trade across the Iranian border expanded.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it has been difficult to obtain reliable estimates of narcotics production and trafficking. There is no ban on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and reliable sources indicate that little has been done by either Soviet or Kabul regime officials to curb drug production.

In the past, the Soviet-imposed regime in Kabul provided statistics on production, trafficking, and seizures to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). However, with the closing of that office in 1986, data reported to the UN has declined. In any case, statistics released by the regime on production, trafficking or domestic abuse are largely discounted, since the regime lacks both the capability and interest to collect reliable data. In addition, what information is released frequently is tailored for propaganda purposes.

However, independent assessments of diplomats and journalists indicate opium cultivation and production are increasing. These increases can be attributed to the disruption and resulting breakdown of the Kabul regime's authority arising from the Soviet invasion and war, and the disruption of Afghanistan's economic infrastructure which has induced many of those Afghans who have not sought refuge abroad to seek income in new ways, notably the low-investment, high-yield cultivation of narcotics, chiefly opium poppy.

Heroin refining reportedly occurs in areas near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in Kabul and, according to local sources, in Herat, although Herat's role has probably declined in recent years due to the severity of fighting which has left Herat a virtual "no-man's land." Kabul is attractive as a center for refining because it is Afghanistan's principal point of international transportation and offers access to the necessary chemicals and a market within the city. Regime-controlled monitoring of most imports and exports, including chemicals used in heroin production, and more significantly regime intelligence operations within

Kabul targeted against merchants, offer circumstantial evidence of involvement in and awareness of refining activities among regime officials. There is no evidence, however, of regime involvement at the policy level in heroin refining.

The regime has estimated that 70 percent of the opium, 90 percent of the hashish, and 100 percent of the heroin either produced or trafficked in Afghanistan is destined for other countries. The regime's figures probably understate the percentage of local drug consumption and fail to note the flow of drugs through Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Instances of heroin seizures concealed in Afghan reports, including large seizures in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, follow a similar pattern, e.g., the heroin is shipped in consignments of dried fruits or nuts and transits the Soviet Union. The pattern suggests an organized heroin trafficking operation, possibly centered in Kabul.

The regime contends that illicit narcotics from Pakistan usually enter the country through Torkham on the Khyber Pass route. Other likely routes of entry include the highway linking Quetta and Kandahar and over the countless trails crossing the largely undemarcated border.

There are indications that heroin trafficking across the Iranian border is also increasing. The regime recently has attempted to improve ties with Iran to reduce Iranian support for the Mujahidin. A rapid expansion of unofficial trade has resulted in Baluchi tribesmen from Afghanistan and Pakistan trading with fellow tribesmen in Iran. Heroin is a principal trade item and is exchanged for consumer goods. These are often re-sold to Soviet personnel in Afghanistan. Heroin purchased in Kabul reportedly sells for twice the price in Herat and four times the price in Mashad (Iran). Many civil servants have abandoned their poor paying jobs to join in this lucrative trade.

There is no reliable information available on money laundering, if any takes place.

A.2. Accomplishments in 1987

The Kabul regime's narcotics control and enforcement activity is confined to the efforts of an anti-smuggling unit in the Ministry of the Interior. Although UN sources have asserted that this unit has been staffed by relatively dedicated personnel, it reportedly is severely underfinanced and carries little weight within the Kabul regime's bureaucracy. The regime claims to have carried out seizures and made arrests, but the numbers cannot be verified. With the closure of the UNFDAC office, monitoring regime narcotics control measures has become very difficult.

A.3. Plans, Programs and Timetables

The regime is not known to have a timetable for the elimination of the illicit cultivation of narcotics.

A.4. Adequacy of Legal and Law Enforcement Measures

Apart from claims of seizures and arrests, (which cannot be confirmed), the Kabul regime's enforcement efforts appear to be at a low level, except for regime/Soviet military actions targeted on Mujahidin who coincidentally may be involved in narcotics production or trafficking. The regime's own possible non-compliance with the terms of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (failure to seek authorization of apparently ongoing sales of non-seized opium to the Soviet Union) would place the regime itself technically outside the regulations of the Convention, to which the regime and the Soviet Union are signatories.

A.5. Domestic Drug Abuse

While the regime admits to a drug abuse problem among the Afghan population, it offers no reliable statistics regarding the extent of the problem. Outside experts estimate that Afghanistan has as many as 100,000 heroin addicts and 250,000 opium users. The most frequent substance abuse is the ingestion of hashish, especially in urban areas among the young. Traditional rural use of narcotics draws little or no government attention.

Press reports continue to state that drug abuse among the occupying Soviet forces continues to rise, involving both heroin and hashish. Indeed, Soviet forces have become a significant market for drugs, particularly hashish, which is spurring production and trafficking.

B.1. The Nature of the Drug Production Problem

Afghanistan is a landlocked South Asian country with an area of 652,090 square miles (254,770 sq km) and an estimated population of fifteen million. More than five million Afghans have sought refuge abroad since 1979. Much of the country is extremely mountainous, posing great problems for overland transport and communication. In the west the climate is arid or semi-arid. Only 14 million hectares are arable, and most of this area requires irrigation.

Opium production has been a common source of income for tribal Afghans for centuries. As such, the narcotic is elaborately woven into tribal social habits and mores. Despite Islamic proscriptions against its use, it is a popular remedy for ailments, particularly among the elderly. It is most commonly smoked, and its value has long made it a common item of trade and means of exchange among tribal and urban Afghans.

Opium poppy is grown mainly in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan (Nangarhar and Paktika), Badakhshan in the north, Herat in the south and in the central province of Samian. Nangarhar is by far the largest producer followed by the Helmand Valley and Badakhshan. Hashish production is more widely dispersed than opium production.

B.2. Factors Affecting Production

The Soviet invasion and the ensuing war between Soviet and regime troops and the Mujahidin resistance have resulted in depopulation of many

areas (sometimes as a conscious policy pursued by Soviet and regime troops) and the destruction of much of the country's rudimentary economic infrastructure. Some five million Afghans have fled their homeland -- roughly one third of the surviving population (estimates of those killed in the war range near one million). The population that has remained has been forced to rely on crops that are less labor-intensive and which do not depend on irrigation systems. In these circumstances, opium, which also provides a large cash return, resists spoilage, and is relatively easy to transport, has become the preferred crop for many farmers. In a situation of virtually non-existent central or local government support and diminished traditional tribal support systems, those farmers who remain are left largely to their own devices in their struggle for the survival of their families. Moral and even religious considerations that might have militated against production of a narcotic are in such circumstances subordinated to imperatives for survival.

The Soviet invasion has increased domestic demand in Afghanistan for both hashish and opiates. Soviet soldiers are a principal source of demand for hashish, but consumption has increased among Afghan youth as well, influenced by the breakdown of social mores in an environment of chronic warfare. Increasing numbers have turned to domestically produced drugs, and foreign drugs (mandrax tablets).

Hashish and opium are assuming a greater importance as means of exchange. Long an important traditional means of barter, hashish in particular is becoming an important element in rural trade. There are, for example, numerous accounts of Soviet and regime soldiers stopping travellers and commercial vehicles on major Afghan roads and demanding hashish bribes as payment to allow passage.

The flight of refugees from rural Afghanistan has imposed great strains on traditional agriculture. Loss of manpower, particularly young men for field work, has contributed significantly to a general reduction in traditional Afghan food production, notably wheat and other cereals. Drought and lack of manpower caused severe food shortages in northern Afghanistan during the winter of 1986-1987. In desperation, farmers in Afghanistan have turned to opium production as a crop requiring low labor investment and relatively high profits with which to purchase food.

An additional factor for Afghanistan's probable increase in opium production is Pakistan's increasing demand for heroin which has encouraged expanded production of opium in Afghanistan. The Afghan regime and the Soviets are also encouraging opium production in an effort to gain the cooperation, or at least neutrality, of Pakistan-Afghanistan border tribes in the Soviet war against the Afghan resistance. These tribes, traditional opium producers, are under increasing Soviet/regime pressure to cooperate in anti-resistance military activity in exchange for the regime's willingness to turn a blind eye to tribal opium production. According to well-founded reports, the regime (with essential Soviet financial support) has actually encouraged production in areas under its control by selling seed and acting as the purchaser of opium from those whose allegiance the regime seeks. Tribal economic dependence on the regime and the Soviets establishes an economic relationship which binds the tribes to the regime and the Soviets and the regime.

Individual resistance elements reportedly engage in opium production and trafficking as a source of income to provide staples for populations under their control and to fund weapon purchases. We have no evidence, however, that such practices are permitted or condoned by the resistance leadership; on the contrary, Mujahidin leaders have spoken out strongly against opium cultivation and have in various instances meted out strong punishments against narcotics growers and traffickers.

As noted, there are credible reports that the regime is an important purchaser of opium from tribal groups. Opium purchased by the regime is in most instances probably sold to the Soviet Union, a traditional purchaser of International Narcotics Control Board-approved "seized" opium.

According to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Afghanistan (like other traditional producers of opium) must report all international sales of opium to International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), confining itself to the sale of only that opium seized in anti-trafficking activity within the country. Recently, reports of such intended sales to the Board have declined significantly, indicating either a precipitous drop in the Kabul regime's opium sales to the Soviet Union, or (as most observers believe) regime's non-compliance with its responsibility to report such sales. (Failure to report places the regime, as a seller, in technical violation of the Convention. The Soviet Union, a purchaser, would not be in technical violation of the Single Convention.)

Regime officials have informed UN contacts that efforts to stem trafficking (efforts generally perceived as not significantly effective in any event) are often thwarted by Soviet troops in the field who are determined to protect their sources of supply.

According to diplomatic reports, the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities is a principal point of contact for the sale of opium by the tribes to the regime. Western diplomats in Kabul report that in 1984 a Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities official told tribal leaders in the border areas that if they cooperated with the regime, they would be allowed to establish heroin laboratories. The Ministry of State Security also is believed to have a liaison role with the tribes on narcotics sales.

B.3. Maximum Achievable Reductions

No regime actions to reduce production are anticipated in 1988. As it continues its attempts to woo political and military support from tribal groups in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border areas, it appears likely that the regime will rely ever more heavily on a tactic of cooperation with these traditional opium producers. Principal constraints governing opium production appear to be climatic.

C.1. Statistical Tables

There are very limited statistics related to narcotics production, pricing, seizures and trafficking in Afghanistan. What is available is provided below. The following production figures are from U.S., UN and other sources. Seizure and arrest figures for 1986 were provided by regime

sources for the period January through October. Regime data are less reliable than data otherwise sourced. Estimates of hashish production are not available.

Data Tables

<u>Year</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
<u>Opium/Heroin</u>			
Cultivated (ha)	1,400-12,500	2,300-25,000	18,500
Eradicated (ha)	minimal	minimal	--
Yield (kg)	30	32	30
<u>Opium</u>			
Yield (mt)	150-450	400-800	400-800
Loss (mt)	70- 85	70- 85	70- 85
Seized (mt)	7	n/k	n/k
Consumed (mt)	30- 40	10- 40	30- 40
Available for Export/Refining (mt)	150-300	100-375	100-375
<u>Seized</u>			
Heroin (kg)	93	n/k	n/k
Hashish (mt)	3.4	n/k	n/k
Cocaine (kg)	93	n/k	n/k
Mandrax (tabs)	151,015	n/k	n/k
<u>Arrests</u>			
Opium	57 (6,959 kg)	n/k	n/k
Heroin	113 (988 kg)	n/k	n/k
Hashish	137 (3,405 kg)	n/k	n/k
Cocaine	10 (683 kg)	n/k	n/k
Mandrax (tabs)	16 (142,015)	n/k	n/k

PAKISTAN

1. Status of Illicit Narcotics Production and Trafficking

Pakistan undertook a major program of crop eradication in 1987, including aerial spraying, but eradication gains were apparently matched by expansion of cultivation to new areas, leaving net production essentially unchanged from the previous year. U.S. Government estimates of opium production range from 135-160 metric tons, compared to a 140-160 ton range in 1986. Pakistani opium production is being driven to a great extent by the country's fast-growing number of heroin addicts, now estimated to be in excess of 600,000, and Pakistan is a net importer of opium. The country also remains a concern to the U.S. because tribal areas along the Afghan frontier are being used as refining sites for converting opium gum into heroin as it transits Pakistan en route to U.S. and European markets. U.S. assistance is designed to help improve the enforcement as well as the eradication capabilities of Pakistan. Vigorous enforcement efforts have resulted in impressive seizures, but have made little headway against major traffickers and refiners.

This 1986/87 production figure is based on estimates of growing areas which range between 9,555 and 10,550 hectares and a yield factor of 11.3 kg. per hectare. The average yield figure is lower this year than in past years, reflecting drought and other adverse weather conditions in growing areas.

There is disagreement between U.S. and GOP officials on the effectiveness of the program in 1987. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board estimated that production actually decreased from 130 to 80 metric tons. U.S. and GOP production estimates differ because, in gathering the data on which these estimates are based (aerial surveys and other sources), the GOP concentrates on surveying traditional poppy growing areas and areas to which the poppy ban has been extended and does less in areas not covered by development agreements, largely tribal areas on the western border where most cultivation has shifted.

Following spotty enforcement in 1985/86, Pakistani authorities redoubled their efforts in the following season, using aerial spraying of herbicides for the first time. Enforcement efforts were preceded by an active public awareness campaign and attempts at establishing a dialogue with local leaders. By all reports, eradication efforts in 1987 were good in areas such as Malakand, Gadoon, and Buner where the GOP was committed to enforce the poppy ban. However, the Pakistani ban on opium cultivation is not enforced in tribal or other areas until they have been scheduled for development assistance. Opium growers responded to effective enforcement of the poppy ban in developing areas by expanding plantings in nearby areas and autonomous tribal regions not subject to enforcement (Dir District, the Hazara Tribal Area, Bajaur, and Mohmand). Thus, positive efforts at eradication have been counterbalanced by increases in cultivation of opium poppy in areas where the ban on cultivation is not in place. It is believed that these areas, including a portion of Dir, and tribal areas like Bajaur and Mohmand, and small areas of Hazara, now account for a majority (sixty percent) of the opium production in Pakistan.

During the 1-56-1-57 harvest cycle, the GOP began a helicopter aerial eradication program on a pilot basis with U. S. assistance. This program resulted in the destruction of about 400 hectares of opium poppy and also served as effective backup to manual eradication efforts. In the 1-57-58 cycle, the GOP is expanding the use of helicopters and is adding fixed wing aerial eradication capacity which will approximately double eradication capability.

Overall opium production estimates are complicated by uncertainty about the number of Pakistani addicts as well as the volume of raw opium exported from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iran for its addict population. A recent survey of drug abuse in Pakistan, funded and supervised by the Federal Republic of Germany, indicates that heroin and opium abusers require 340 MT of opium or its equivalent. Even allowing a generous margin for error, it is clear that Pakistan is a net importer of opium.

Much of the opium and heroin originating in Afghanistan is transported to Peshawar via the tribal areas adjacent to the Afghan border. Opium output in Afghanistan is estimated at 200-300 metric tons; large amounts of opium and heroin are smuggled into Pakistan across the Afghan border, but there are no precise estimates of the total amount.

Pakistani hashish (the resin of cannabis sativa) produced from local cannabis plants is exported to the United States essentially along the same routes used by the heroin traffickers.

The heroin manufactured for U.S. consumption is predominately injectable heroin. The drug generally enters the United States concealed in air and sea cargo, for example in consignments of textiles, sports equipment, and surgical instruments, and is also hidden in luggage, personal effects, and/or the body cavities of couriers. Narcotics for local consumption in Pakistan normally take the form of less highly refined "brown sugar" (heroin base).

Afghan Resistance leaders based in Pakistan have publicly stated their opposition to the narcotics trade. Nevertheless, some Afghan refugees are involved in the heroin trade as opium poppy growers, opium stockists, manufacturers, middlemen, or international traffickers. Some leaders in the NWFP have encouraged opium poppy farmers to continue growing poppy until the GOP reimburses them for lost income. Opposition political parties are opposed to narcotics production, with the exception of the leftist National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP has consistently denounced efforts to control opium cultivation, frequently charging that such actions are prompted by the United States to the detriment of NWFP farmers.

Pakistan is not a major center for money laundering. The structure of the Pakistani financial system, the existence of the "hundi" system, and the large number of overseas Pakistanis who regularly transmit funds in a variety of forms make the Pakistani financial picture extremely complicated. For example, interest rate differentials between Pakistan and the rest of the world are responsible for large movements of funds. While drug money is undoubtedly involved, the situation is not driven by drugs. In fact, several efforts to analyze drug-related funds have concluded that

most Pakistanis -- particularly drug traders -- prefer to keep large foreign exchange holdings overseas. However, some money derived from illicit narcotics trafficking undoubtedly has had an impact on the Pakistani economy. The DEA has uncovered several instances of major traffickers who have purchased property or legitimate businesses, such as movie theaters, in order to invest a portion of the money they have acquired through their illegal activities.

Law enforcement personnel in Pakistan, as in many other lesser-developed countries in the world, are poorly paid and are susceptible to bribes from traffickers. Law enforcement agencies (see A.4. below) have not, except in a handful of cases, arrested important narcotics traffickers, financiers, and organizers. It should be noted, however, that the PNCB, in cooperation with Pakistan Customs, has assisted DEA-initiated investigations which have resulted in arrests in the United States of several major Pakistani traffickers. During Pakistan/U.S. narcotics working group meetings, the U.S. side reemphasized concern about the need to target enforcement efforts against major narcotics traffickers. This matter was also raised at other times during the year with President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo by both Ambassador Rappel and high ranking U.S. officials (e.g. Under Secretary Armacost, Assistant Secretary Wolfstetter).

A.3: Accomplishments in 1987

In July 1987, the GOP initiated its 1987-88 program to enforce the ban on opium poppy cultivation. The Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) made a joint announcement opposing cultivation of opium poppy and asserting the intention of the government to destroy such cultivation. The Ministry of Interior, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), and the NWFP government began implementing plans involving public awareness campaigns and meetings with tribal leaders to discourage planting, manual destruction of plantings where reachable, and aerial eradication of remaining poppy. In August 1987 the PNCB and the Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) began nationwide anti-narcotic, anti-opium cultivation campaigns which have continued to date.

The GOP began aerial herbicide eradication during the 1986-87 growing season using helicopters which were reconditioned and prepared for spraying with U.S. assistance. The GOP plans to expand use of these helicopters in 1988. The GOP also decided in May 1987 to expand its aerial eradication capacity by adding a fixed-wing spray capability, using an aircraft on loan from INM. In place by late January 1988, this aircraft will enable the GOP to extend eradication into areas where topography and lack of government control have previously limited access. The United States is also assisting the GOP's aerial spraying operation with procurement of commodities, supplies, and technical services.

In 1987, the Pakistan National Assembly's Special Legislative Committee on Narcotics completed a study of narcotics problems in Pakistan and submitted a report condemning opium poppy cultivation, trafficking in narcotics, and their abuse. The report made recommendations ranging from increased penalties for violators of Pakistani law to increased budgetary

support for law enforcement. It is significant to note that in 1986 some members of this same Assembly walked out to protest enforcement action against opium poppy cultivation.

Began in 1985, the NM's extensive narcotics interdiction program has continued to expand. In 1987 a new organization, the Maritime Security Agency, was given responsibility for narcotics interdiction in Pakistan's territorial waters. A training course in maritime interdiction for this new unit was funded by INM and taught by the U. S. Coast Guard.

Both the PNCB and Pakistan Customs have received GOP budgetary approval this year to expand their special drug enforcement cells. Pakistan Customs also is in the process of developing special contraband enforcement teams (CETs) modeled after U. S. Customs' CETs. Training for these new teams is being funded by the Pakistan Narcotics Control Program budget and programmed by U. S. Customs. One team in Lahore was trained in 1987 and another in Karachi will be trained in 1988. U.S. Customs also provided training to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to help ensure that PAF aircraft are not used to transport narcotics.

In June 1987 the Pakistan National Assembly amended the Dangerous Drug Act of 1936 to include a provision for asset seizure. Assets which can be seized include real estate, stock shares or money derived from the proceeds of drug trafficking. The extent to which this law will be useful to narcotics enforcement will not be known until it has been tested in the Pakistani courts. It should be noted, however, that in a recent international case, the GOP used this law to justify delving deeply into a defendant's Pakistani bank records, a marked departure from the GOP's normal practice of refusing to make available financial records.

As a result of U.S. efforts to extradite a major Pakistani drug trafficker, Zulqarnan Khan, a Pakistani court ruled during 1987 that a Pakistan national who conspires to commit a narcotic offense in the United States may be extradited to the U.S. on request, even if he was not in United States jurisdiction when the offense took place. Khan is presently a fugitive from justice, but upon his arrest, the GOP has indicated readiness to proceed with the extradition process.

A.3. Plans, Programs, and Timetables

Since its inception, enforcement of the GOP ban on cultivation has been closely linked to the provision of development assistance to each specific growing region. The GOP has initiated several new activities to reduce opium production. Expansion of the aerial eradication program, especially the addition of fixed wing spray capability, will reinforce other GOP efforts to enforce the poppy ban. After political exhortation, public warnings, and manual destruction have taken place, the GOP will have the capacity and flexibility to eradicate remaining crops.

In late 1987 and 1988 the GOP plans to eliminate opium poppy cultivation throughout the country except for portions of Dir, the tribal areas, and two small areas in Hazara. Opium poppy not eliminated under the means described above will be eradicated by aerial spraying. It is

important to note that the areas not subject to the ban on cultivation are now believed to account for approximately sixty percent of the total production in Pakistan. Development assistance will be scheduled in these areas prior to the commencement of eradication efforts.

Currently, there are four major and three minor growing areas where development projects and enforcement efforts have not been initiated. In order of importance, the major areas are the Bajaur and Mohmand tribal areas, Hazara District, and Indus-Kabistan. The minor areas are the tribal areas of Orakzai, Khyber, and South and North Waziristan. It is expected that funding for projects in these areas will be provided by a consortium of donors in the future.

The GOP, with USAID funding and technical assistance, has developed a Special Developmental Enforcement Plan (SDEP) which will use crop control and development assistance to further eliminate cultivation. Although the plan does not establish a date by which all opium poppy will be eliminated, the ultimate end to opium poppy cultivation depends upon funding sufficient to carry out development projects in the growing areas and the parallel vigor with which the GOP enforces bans on production and other legal measures. As projects are instituted, the ban is extended on a phased basis.

The difficult issue of ending production in the tribal areas was raised in meetings held in 1987. Participants were optimistic that a method could be devised to eventually end cultivation in the tribal areas but no concrete plans have been formulated. The officials agreed to give the question more study and to meet again in January 1988. We anticipate the development of a strategy to eliminate opium poppy cultivation in the tribal areas, and the early implementation of that plan, perhaps beginning as soon as June 1988.

In December 1986, the Pakistan Interior Secretary and the Indian Home Secretary agreed to form a ten-member committee to exchange information relating to drug traffickers and smugglers operating from either side of the common border, and agreed the committee would meet periodically to develop strategy. This committee met twice in 1987 and both parties have indicated that they found the meetings to be productive.

A.4. Adequacy of Legal and Law Enforcement Measures

The Pakistani legal system is over-burdened with delays in prosecution of criminal cases, including narcotics cases. Recently the National Assembly passed a speedy trial law which should hasten trials of major narcotics offenders.

The effectiveness of the asset seizure law enacted in 1987 has yet to be tested in Pakistani courts.

Though evidence collected by wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping is admissible in Pakistani courts, there are no legal guidelines for its acquisition in narcotics cases. In the absence of legal authority, enforcement agencies feel constrained by civil liberties statutes, even

though evidence gained through such methods can be key to proving conspiracy.

The GOP has a program to identify, arrest, and prosecute traffickers. Insofar as users and street level pushers and distributors are involved, the provincial police forces have primary responsibility (under the overall authority of the Ministry of the Interior). Besides interdicting street peddlers, provincial police enforce the government's ban on opium poppy cultivation and provide personnel to Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF) units.

Building upon provincial police attempts to reduce the availability of drugs, the GOP has developed specialized narcotics investigation units. These units are part of the Special Drug Enforcement Cells (SDEC) of Customs and the Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF) units of the PNCB, which also have interdiction responsibilities. Interdiction techniques are well understood by GOP enforcement agencies since such law enforcement procedures have long been in use. Pakistani law enforcement officials do not normally press conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges, and to not use other specialized investigative techniques to develop cases against major traffickers. As a consequence, more attention is paid to interdiction than investigative work against major traffickers.

One promising law enforcement approach is the GOP's "Foreign Enforcement Agencies Cooperative Program." This program targets traffickers in the United States and other foreign countries, thereby assisting the United States (through the DEA) and others to reach major trafficking organizations. Under this program, the GOP permits any country so desiring to station drug enforcement personnel in Pakistan. At the same time, the GOP permits the foreign law enforcement liaison officers, utilizing their own independent informant networks, to initiate and conduct investigations involving smuggling of narcotics outside Pakistan. Customs, SDEC, and JNTF units cooperate in these investigations at the request of the foreign liaison officers and assist in all cases requiring controlled deliveries of narcotics to foreign countries. Currently, the U.S. has fifteen narcotics enforcement officers and two analysts in Pakistan. Enforcement officers from countries other than the U.S. include the following:

Federal Republic of Germany/BKA
The Netherlands/CRI
United Kingdom/HM Customs
Nordic Countries/Norway Police
Canada/RCMP
Australia

The PNCB, a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Interior, is the principal governmental body concerned with the narcotics control effort. The GOP established the PNCB in March 1973 in fulfillment of its obligations under the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The charter creating the board gives it wide-ranging responsibilities of an enforcement, advisory, supervisory and coordinating nature. The PNCB has regional offices in each provincial capital to which a total of fifteen

Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF) units are attached. (JNTF units are hybrid enforcement groups consisting of elements of the PNCB, the provincial police, the provincial excise and taxation departments, and, in certain units, Customs and Pakistan Rangers.)

The Customs Service of the Finance Ministry has the responsibility to interdict narcotics crossing Pakistan's borders; special Customs drug enforcement cells have been established to assist in this effort. In addition, Customs anti-smuggling mobile units have also been actively involved this past year in narcotics enforcement. Pakistan Customs officials inspect all luggage on international flights; inspectors must initial passports to aid in subsequent investigations should narcotics be discovered later. Customs has also developed a computer assisted management system to identify SDEC and regional offices which have poor or substandard performance.

Other government agencies concerned with narcotics laws are the provincial police forces, the provincial departments of excise and taxation, the Federal Investigation Agency, the Airport Security Force, the Coast Guard, the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, the Pakistan Rangers, the Northwest Frontier Levies, the Bajaur, Dir, Malakand, Mamsod, and Baluchistan Scouts. The Frontier Constabulary, the Frontier Corps, and the Bajaur, Dir, Mamsod, and Baluchistan Scouts are paramilitary, quasi-police forces operating in the tribal areas of the frontier and in Baluchistan. These units have increased narcotics-related surveillance, not only within the tribal areas, but also on the borders between these areas and the rest of Pakistan. The Rangers are paramilitary units which patrol the Indo-Pakistan border.

The provincial excise and taxation departments are responsible for enforcing The Dangerous Drugs Act and provincial excise enactments proscribing opium cultivation, processing and possession. Since enactment of the law prohibiting the use and cultivation of opium, these agencies have intensified efforts against narcotics trafficking.

A.5. Domestic Drug Abuse

The PNCB reports that the number of heroin addicts increased to 660,000 in 1987 from 500,000 reported in 1986. This compares to 500,000 heroin addicts in the United States; on a per capita basis, the heroin addiction rate in Pakistan is about two and a half times that in the U.S. The PNCB estimates there are also approximately 260,000 opium addicts in Pakistan. There are 26 centers in Pakistan having both inpatient and outpatient narcotics treatment facilities. In all, some 300 beds are available countrywide for inpatient addiction treatment. These centers, using the "cold turkey" approach coupled with symptomatic treatment of withdrawal pains, have a reported cure rate of approximately 20 percent -- with an unknown number of relapses.

B.1. Nature of Illicit Drug Production

The PNCB estimates that 80 mt of opium were produced from 5370 hectares of opium poppy growing in Dir, Bajaur, Mamsod, Orakzai and

Hazara. The board's survey does not include growing areas in South Waziristan, Kurram and Nonistan. As in earlier years, the survey is based on actual physical inspections, a review of provincial department of agriculture records, and interviews with area farmers. As noted above, U.S. estimates are considerably higher: 135-150 mt.

The PNCE is unable to estimate the amount of heroin refined in the production centers of Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, and Bajaur agencies. Nationwide heroin seizures for the first nine months of 1987 were 2.2 tons. Approximately 4.5 tons of heroin were seized in 1986.

Data concerning cannabis cultivation and production are not collected. Cannabis grows wild throughout Pakistan and is systematically cultivated in Chitral and other northern areas of the country.

There is no licit production of narcotics in Pakistan.

B.2. Factors Affecting Production

In the 1986-87 crop year the GOP publicized widely its intention to enforce the poppy ban, warning farmers that if they persisted in planting opium, crops would be destroyed, either manually or by aerial spraying. Negotiations with tribal political leaders also emphasized voluntary compliance, backed up with the threat of eradication. In an attempt to maximize voluntary compliance, forcible manual eradication and aerial spraying were delayed until late in the crop's growth cycle, resulting in less than optimum effectiveness in eradication. In the few weeks during which aerial spraying took place, the helicopter spray effort eradicated only about 400 hectares of poppy, but this test program clearly demonstrated the efficiency of aerial eradication in the mountainous terrain of The NWFP. Perhaps more importantly, the limited but successful use of aerial eradication enhanced the GOP's credibility and proved the effectiveness of aerial eradication as an enforcement tool.

For the 1987-88 crop cycle, the GOP has redoubled public awareness efforts and narcotics-related negotiations with tribal leaders. As a result of last year's campaign, aerial eradication is a more effective threat. The GOP has indicated that with the increased aerial spray capacity, it is prepared to destroy poppy fields beyond the areas where the ban has been extended, such as portions of Dir, the tribal areas, the Black Mountains, and Indus Kohistan.

According to Pakistani agricultural sources, the arid conditions at the beginning of the 1987-88 planting season will reduce the opium yield this year from the normal 20 kg per hectare to about 10-12 kg. per hectare. The drought should also reduce the hectarage planted in areas not subject to enforcement from 5,600 hectares to about 3,900 hectares.

B.3. Maximum Achievable Reductions

With maximum achievable reductions, the Pakistan opium harvest could be reduced to 30 to 35 metric tons of opium in 1988.

B.4. Methodology

Estimates of poppy cultivation for the 1987-1988 growing season are based on aerial photography and the PNCB's land survey, as well as all other information available. This best case estimate is predicated on the following assumptions: a) the GOP will destroy all opium poppy in areas to which the poppy ban has been extended and in some areas to which the ban has not been extended; b) the drought this year will reduce average yield from a normal 20 kg. per hectare to about 10-12.5 kg per hectare; and c) the drought will reduce potential hectareage in areas not subject to enforcement from 5600 hectares to about 3900 hectares. Assumptions about GOP enforcement are based on plans, actions now being taken, and intentions to enforce the poppy ban. Assumptions on the effects of the drought which occurred during the planting season are based on expert opinion from the GOP Department of Agriculture and NAU's agricultural specialist.

C.1. Statistical Tables

A. Summary Table

<u>Year</u>		<u>1987</u>	<u>1987</u>
Gross Cultivation	(ha)	8,800-11,340	10,355-12,180
Gross Poten. Prod.	(mt)	130-230	155-180
Eradicated	(ha)	1,500	1,300
Crops Eradicated	(mt)	30	20
Net Cultivation	(ha)	5,000-10,040	9,055-10,880
Net Production	(mt)	100-200	135-160

B. Data Table

<u>Year</u>		<u>1988</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1985</u>
<u>Opium</u>					
Gross Cultivation	(mt)	9,030	11,270	7,305	2,770
Gross Poten. Prod.	(mt)	180	165	155	55
Eradicated	(ha)	1,500	1,300	375	10
Crops Eradicated	(mt)	30	20	7	.2
Net Cultivation	(ha)	7,530	9,970	7,430	2,760
Net Production	(mt)	150	150	150	55
<u>Refining</u>					
Heroin	(mt)	5	5	5	5
<u>Seizures</u>					
Opium		3	3.4	2.7	2.3
Heroin		4	2.2	4.5	5.5
Cannabis (Resin)		80	61.2	80	90
Other drugs		.050	.040	.015	.028
<u>Arrests</u>		15,700	902	26,500	10,072
			(Sept 30)		

FNCE makes one complete survey of arrests country-wide after end of year. 1987 figures do not reflect end of year survey. Arrest data from FNCE reports.

Domestic Consumption: (mt)

	17-34	17-34	n/a	n/a
Heroin				
Other drugs	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Labs Destroyed:

	n/a	21	19	19
Heroin				

Licit Production: None

Users:

Opium	170,000	260,000	250,000	315,000
Heroin	690,000	660,000	500,000	350,000
Cannabis				
(Resin)	580,000	530,000	250,000	500,000
Other	55,000	55,000	n/a	n/a

E.1. Resources Requirements

We do not believe any more resources are needed in CY 87, 88, or 89 than those already planned in order to maintain the present momentum of the anti-narcotics program in Pakistan; nor do we believe large increases in resources will increase the momentum. However, should the GOP develop a feasible strategy to rid the tribal areas of opium poppy, some increase in resources from whatever source would be justified.